What changed
A network path to vCenter became an administrator session
Broadcom published a fix for CVE-2026-123890 on 19 November. The flaw is in VMware Directory Service. Someone who can reach a vulnerable vCenter over the network can bypass authentication and gain unauthorized access. Broadcom rates it critical and lists no workaround; the fixed build depends on the product and branch.
Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant say the actor they track as ARMORY CASTLE used the flaw in early September. In the intrusion they investigated, a tool called BONESAW reached vCenter, created an SSO administrator account and obtained directory data. That is evidence from a specific investigation, not a measure of how many organizations were attacked.
Patch and investigate
Defender workflow
Start with the vCenter instance, then its trust relationships
- 1
Identify and patch. Inventory vCenter and VMware Cloud Foundation versions. Use Broadcom's response matrix for the exact fixed build; vCenter 7 customers with extended support need the vendor's guidance.
- 2
Review the exposure window. Check network access to the vCenter RPC and SSO services, especially from systems that had no reason to administer the virtual estate. GTIG observed activity in September, so a November-only log search may be too short.
- 3
Investigate identity changes. Look for unexpected SSO administrators, new machine accounts, unusual directory database access and Security Token Service changes. If these appear, treat the vSphere identity plane as potentially compromised and follow incident-response procedures.
Defender note
The hidden risk is trust in the administrator session
A vCenter sign-in can look legitimate after the attacker has forged or created the account behind it. Correlate identity changes with the host that initiated them and with changes to ESXi or VM administration. GTIG's account of this actor is valuable for hunting, but an organization should avoid treating the absence of its named tools as proof that its vCenter was safe.