What happened
A support tool became a delivery channel
ConnectWise is investigating unauthorized access to some partner ScreenConnect environments. Huntress observed an operator issuing commands through cloud-hosted partner consoles to managed endpoints, where the commands installed a second ScreenConnect client connected to attacker-controlled infrastructure and staged the SCKit toolkit. Microsoft independently describes the same rogue-client and SCKit behavior.
The initial entry method is still under investigation. ConnectWise says abuse of independently developed RMM+ extensions is a possible route; it has not established that every environment with one of those extensions was compromised. The company also says it has found no evidence that its own infrastructure was breached.
Do not collapse the two paths
Defender workflow
Check the console, the endpoint and the person connecting to it
- 1
Follow the current extension guidance. On each ScreenConnect instance, check the third-party extensions listed in ConnectWise's advisory and keep the identified ones disabled. This matters especially for on-premises installations, where ConnectWise cannot disable them for you.
- 2
Verify technician clients. Confirm the installed client on every technician workstation is version 26.6.5 or later. A patched server or cloud console does not prove the technician client has been updated.
- 3
Look for established access. Preserve Run Command, Toolbox, extension and sign-in records. On managed endpoints, identify unexpected ScreenConnect clients, their relay destinations, scheduled tasks and Run entries. Include technician workstations that connected to suspect devices.
- 4
Respond through a separate channel. Use trusted endpoint response tools to investigate suspect machines. Revoke affected ScreenConnect and identity-provider sessions from a clean device, then remove unauthorized clients and persistence only after preserving evidence.
Defender note
An update does not remove a second client
The client update blocks the attempted endpoint-to-technician transfer described by ConnectWise. It does not remove a rogue client that an attacker already installed, or tell you what commands ran through the partner console. Keep the server-side extension question, the client version and the incident look back as three separate checks.