A key-only account could accept a password

An account reserved for SSH keys should not let someone in with a password. On certain Linux systems using musl, OpenSSH could instead accept an unusually long password for an account whose stored password field is *. OpenSSH released 10.6p2 on 5 November to close the path, and Alpine shipped fixed packages for supported and several older releases.

The conditions are specific: OpenSSH must handle password checks without PAM, password login must be enabled, a target account must have a * password field, and another local account must have a suitable password hash. A host running Alpine is a reason to check, not proof that the host is vulnerable. Containers without a running SSH server are outside this path.

Attempts have been seen

Previdian reports attempts against its sensors from 6 to 8 November. Sensor counts show targeting, not the number of real systems compromised.

Check what the running service actually permits

  1. 1

    Identify exposed hosts. Find musl-based systems running OpenSSH, especially internet-facing Alpine servers. Check PAM use, PasswordAuthentication, and the relevant account records.

  2. 2

    Install the fixed package and restart. Apply OpenSSH 10.6p2 or the distribution's patched package. Restart sshd; updating files on disk does not replace the running service.

  3. 3

    Review past logins. Investigate successful password logins to accounts that should accept only keys. If a login cannot be explained, preserve evidence and treat the host as potentially compromised.

The restart is part of the fix

Alpine recommends disabling password authentication and restarting sshd if an update cannot be applied immediately. Test key access before changing that setting, and keep an existing session open until a new login works. The core question is whether the live SSH service still offers the vulnerable authentication path.