An edge device became a route into the directory

Volexity was called to investigate suspicious activity in early October. The starting point was an Ivanti Connect Secure appliance running 22.8R2.4—the current patch at the time. The attacker chained an authentication bypass, code execution and a separate privilege-escalation flaw to run commands as root without signing in.

Once inside, the attacker did not stop at the VPN. Volexity observed attempts to obtain credentials held by the appliance, query Active Directory, search for LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys, and spray passwords against accounts. Those are observations from Volexity's investigation, not evidence that every vulnerable appliance suffered the same sequence.

The patch picture changed

Ivanti fixed the CVE-2026-104935 entry path on 13 October. Volexity updated its report to say a patch for the separate privilege escalation, CVE-2026-111357, was published on 29 October. CISA added that CVE and CVE-2026-118527 to its exploited-vulnerabilities catalogue on 30 October. Check Ivanti's current advisory for the exact build; we could not independently verify its fixed-version table.

Two more CVEs, one incident timeline

CISA describes CVE-2026-111357 as a local privilege-escalation step that can be chained with CVE-2026-104935 and CVE-2026-118527. It describes CVE-2026-118527 as a way for a remote authenticated attacker to place attacker-controlled files in a predictable location. These are additional identifiers for stages in the exploited chain, not proof of three independent compromises on every appliance.

The two new KEV entries have different US federal remediation dates: 2 November for CVE-2026-111357 and 13 November for CVE-2026-118527. Those dates are not a safe waiting period for an exposed organisation. Verify the vendor's latest release, apply applicable fixes, and investigate the earlier October window.

The attacker tried to leave very little on disk

Volexity says commands and results travelled through the exploit requests themselves. It did not find a webshell on the investigated appliance. The attacker also removed selected debug and audit log entries and restored altered in-memory state. In this case, Ivanti's integrity checker could not detect the activity Volexity reconstructed from memory, core dumps and other forensic evidence.

That is a useful warning about the limits of a clean-looking appliance, not a reason to abandon routine checks. Keep the integrity check, but pair it with network, identity and endpoint evidence that the appliance cannot erase.

Make two decisions, not one

  1. 1

    Close the entry point. Inventory exposed Connect Secure appliances, record their exact builds and apply Ivanti's applicable update. Verify the result on each device.

  2. 2

    Scope the time before the fix. Preserve appliance evidence and review external network, VPN authentication and directory logs. Look for access from the VPN host to domain controllers, credential stores and other systems it should not normally touch.

  3. 3

    Treat stolen secrets as a separate workstream. If compromise is plausible, assess LDAP bind credentials, service accounts, LAPS and BitLocker material that the appliance could reach. Plan rotation and recovery with identity and incident-response owners rather than declaring the case closed when the patch lands.